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MAIL-VOTING DURING COVID-19: PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
EXPANDING VOTING ACCESSIBILITY 
Emily Kawahara* 
 
The history of American treatment of civil liberties during national security crises 
thus teaches several important lessons . . . it teaches that the perceived threats to 
national security that have motivated the sacrifice of civil liberties during times of 
crisis are often overblown and factually unfounded.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 As the U.S. faces a true threat to national health and safety from COVID-19,2 vote-by-
mail fraud has been reoriented into an additional and, in some cases, more dire threat than the 
growing infection rate and death toll from the pandemic. According to President Donald Trump, 
the use of mail-in ballots during the 2020 presidential election would be “the scandal of our 
times!”3 President Trump has used his public platform to continuously and adamantly question 
the integrity of the democratic process. When asked in an interview that aired on Fox News 
whether he would accept the election outcome in November, President Trump stated “I have to 
see” after asserting that the election will be rigged by mail-in voting.4 From April to July, 
President Trump “made five dozen false claims about mail balloting.”5 In a July tweet, he 
warned that mail-voting “will lead to the most CORRUPT ELECTION in our Nation’s 
History.”6 These assertions of baseless claims used to question the integrity of the democratic 
system and the legitimacy of the upcoming election redirects the public’s focus, distracting from 
the pandemic. As perfectly summarized by Katie Glueck of the New York Times, “the 
presidential race is now not simply a fight over character, competence or even vicious personal 
attacks,” instead the 2020 presidential election “is also about one of the fundamental pillars of 
American democracy: free and fair elections, and faith in the outcome.”7  
 
*Thank you Professor Dov Fox for your comments, advice, and positivity. Thank you Mark Estes, Liz Parker, and the rest of the 
Legal Research Center librarians at the University of San Diego School of Law for your patience and guidance. 
1 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. 
RTS. 11, 19 (1988). 
2 See Coronaviruses, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTION DISEASE, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-
conditions/coronaviruses (last updated May 19, 2020) (offering an overview of coronaviruses); Michelle A. Jorden et. al., Ctr’s 
for Disease Control & Prevention, Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, January-February 
2020, 69 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP., 680, 680 (2020) 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6922e1.htm#suggestedcitation (explaining the timeline of travel-related and 
nontravel-related COVID-19 cases);  Michelle L. Holshue et al., First Case of 2019 Novel Corona Virus in the United States, N. 
ENGL. J. MED. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2001191 (providing a case report of the first 
COVID-19 case in the U.S.). 
3 @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (June 22, 2020, 4:16 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1275024974579982336. 
4 Interview by Chris Wallace with Donald Trump, President, United States, in Washington D.C. (July 19, 2020). 
5 Maggie Haberman et al., Trump’s False Attacks on Voting by Mail Stir Broad Concern, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/politics/trump-vote-by-mail.html. (“About a third of the president’s falsehoods were 
general warnings about widespread fraud in mail-voting. Another 11 were specific claims about held-up mail carriers, stolen and 
forged ballots and dead people voting.”). 
6 @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (July 21, 2020, 4:21 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1285540318503407622 
(including the following hashtag: #RIGGEDELECTION). 






 To be clear, the November 2020 presidential election will go on. President Trump called 
to postpone the election in a July tweet stating: “With Universal Mail-In Voting (not Absentee 
Voting, which is good), 2020 will be the most INACCURATE & FRAUDULENT Election in 
history. It will be a great embarrassment to the USA. Delay the Election until people can 
properly, securely and safely vote???”8 However, a president does not have this type of 
authority. Article II of the U.S. Constitution states that, “[t]he Congress may determine the time 
of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the 
same throughout the United States.”9 In an act approved by the Twenty-Eighth Congress in 1845, 
the presidential election date was fixed to “the Tuesday next after the first Monday in the month 
of November.”10 Even if Congress passed bipartisan legislation to change the date of the 
election, the Constitution clearly instructs that the President and Vice President terms “end at 
noon on the 20th day of January” and terms for Senators and Representatives end “at noon on the 
3d day of January,”11 leaving little time between a changed election date and the end of term. 
Therefore, delaying the election is, if not impossible, extremely difficult.12 The election will be 
held as planned and voting during the public health emergency is not a question of if, but how. 
 Civil liberties have historically been sacrificed in the name of national security. However, 
there should be serious concern that “overblown and factually unfounded”13 claims about mail-
voting leading to fraud will be used in an attempt to motivate voters to either sacrifice their 
individual right to vote or risk their health in the name of a false threat, during a real global 
pandemic. Judge Brennan, addressing preserving civil liberties during a crisis, observed that 
“[a]fter each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized that the 
abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to prevent itself from 
repeating the error when the next crisis came along.”14 This article addresses the COVID-19 
pandemic, the false claims of mail-voting fraud, and the immediate unique opportunity for the 
U.S. to break the cycle of error repetition. Voters should not be “brav[ing] the flu filled air” as 
they did in 1918 to cast a ballot, when voters in 2020 have a reliable option to cast ballots 
through mail. 
 The types of election adjustments previously used during national emergencies are not 
applicable for the fluid and novel COVID-19 situation. However, the current crisis, like crises 
prior, does require a case-specific solution. This article does not offer a specific formula to 
improve election emergency statutes, although there are strong arguments for categorizing the 
type of crisis as a way of measuring the necessary response.15 Nor does this article argue that the 
nuances of COVID-19 fit into pre-established absentee voter qualifications for normal elections, 
as discussed below. Instead, this article claims that universalizing mail-voting as a case-specific 
 
8 @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (July 30, 2020, 5:46 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1288818160389558273. 
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
10 An Act to establish a uniform time for holding elections for electors of President and Vice President in all the States of the 
Union, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (1845).  
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
12 See Miles Parks, Why Is Voting By Mail (Suddenly) Controversial? Here’s What You Need To Know, NPR (June 4, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/06/04/864899178/why-is-voting-by-mail-suddenly-controversial-heres-what-you-need-to-know; 
Alexander Burns, Why Trump Has No Power to Delay the 2020 Elections, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/us/politics/trump-postpone-election.html;  
13 Brennan, Jr., supra note 1. 
14 Id. at 11. 
15 See Michael T. Morley, Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 67 EMORY L.J. 
545 (2018), for a discussion of ways to improve election emergency statutes by categorizing the emergency as one of three types 
of situations to apply the appropriate type of relief, ultimately limiting the discretion of election officials and prioritizing 
delaying, rescheduling, or extending voter periods before votes are cast. 
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solution for the election during COVID-19 serves two purposes. Firstly, mail-voting during the 
pandemic is a necessary countermeasure to protect public health and safety. Secondly, this 
extraordinary year provides opportunity to expedite necessary election modifications that 
encourage exercise of the franchise and expand accessibility to historically disenfranchised 
eligible voters. 
 Part I discusses modifications made in prior elections held during or in the wake of crises. 
Crises highlighted are the 2001 New York Primary Election during the World Trade Center 
terrorist attack, the 2012 Presidential Election days after Hurricane Sandy, the 1942 and 1944 
elections during World War II Japanese American internment, and the 1918 Midterm Election 
during the infamous flu pandemic. Part II explains the foundation of absentee voting, 
highlighting its origins and development through election law. Part III differentiates between true 
and perceived threats during the 2020 election and in mail-voting. It argues that mail-voting 
should be universally applied during this year’s presidential election in order to protect the 
general public from the global pandemic. However, there are issues with mail-voting that must 
be considered and fixed prior to November that focus on accessibility for minority populations 
and not on the unfounded claims that mail-voting leads to greater election fraud or benefits one 
political party over the other. Part IV shows that challenges to the established absentee voter 
laws that attempt to fit the pandemic into excuse categories have failed. It then argues that rather 
than fitting into laws that dictate a normal election year, mail-voting should be implemented as a 
necessary and contemporary countermeasure to protect public health and safety. This argument 
is supported by the logic applied in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.16 The article concludes that mail-
voting during the COVID-19 pandemic is not only a case-specific solution, it is also a catalyst 
for necessary improvements to election accessibility. 
 
I. PAST U.S. ELECTIONS DURING CRISIS 
 States are inconsistent in their statutes and in how they prepare for and execute plans 
during emergencies. Each state and the District of Columbia assigns the emergency decision 
making power to a different person, agency, or entity.17 For example, a survey issued by the 
National Association of Secretaries of States (NASS) in the wake of Hurricane Sandy showed 
these differences by highlighting who is given authority by statutes to suspend or postpone an 
election as a result of an emergency.18 Eight states confirmed that authority is given to the 
Governors, the chief state election official, or a combination of the two after a state of emergency 
is declared by the Governor.19 In four states, the authority is given to the chief state election 
official or a local election official.20 And in several states where there is no specific law 
addressing this issue, states noted in the survey responses that authority could come from a 
 
16 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (continuing as the leading authority for state police power regarding public health). 
17 See generally Election Emergencies Happen, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2008), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-emergencies-happen.aspx; Election Emergencies, NAT’L CONF. 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-emergencies.aspx; See 
NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE TASK FORCE, STATE LAWS & PRACTICES FOR THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF ELECTIONS 1, 
15 (2014), https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/Election%20Cybersecurity/report-NASS-emergency-preparedness-elections-
apr2017.pdf. 
18 See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 17 (noting that of the survey conducted in 2013, thirty-seven 
state responded and information for the remaining states was gathered by the NASS through researching state laws). 
19 See generally id. at 15-16.  
20 See id. at 16-17. 
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variety of places, like a court order or legislative action, in an emergency situation.21 Needless to 
say, state emergency response lacks uniformity.  
 Prior to COVID-19, at least forty-five states had statutes that addressed Election Day 
emergencies,22 however, these statutes were broad sweeping. For example, some statutes grant 
governors the broad power “to suspend statutes,”23 or “to suspend regulatory statutes, which may 
include statutes related to election,”24 whereas some statutes specify that the power granted is 
only “emergency power over some aspect of an election.”25 While the statutes greatly varied, 
they most commonly addressed emergency responses that included delaying or rescheduling the 
election, relocating polling places, and a mix of the two.26 In reality, “most state election codes 
do not contain provisions that specifically attempt to mitigate the impact of public health crises, 
extreme weather events, natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other calamities (collectively, 
“emergencies”) on the electoral process.”27  
 For the purpose of Part I, the article will highlight responses to crises during elections. 
Responses include instances of cancelling election dates or rescheduling election dates at new 
polling locations, creating polling locations for specifically quarantined populations, and 
permitting in-person voting to continue as planned. Despite a lack of uniformity among state 
emergency statutes, there has been a common theme in state actions to preserve the fundamental 
right to vote – or, at least, an attempt to preserve this fundamental right – when responding to 
emergencies. 
 
A. 2001 New York Primary Election and the World Trade Center Attack 
 The polls were open for the New York primary when planes crashed into the World 
Trade Center the morning of September 11, 2001.28 In that moment, priorities changed as 
candidates who had been “attending to their last subway stops, interviews, telephone calls and 
literature distribution[s]” responded to the emergency at hand and “headed for hospitals to 
donate blood, or their offices to follow the events, or home to join stunned family members.”29  
 Under the New York Executive Law, Governor George Pataki suspended statutes 
surrounding the primary election since “compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder, 
or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster.”30 The Emergency Primary Election 
Rescheduling Act of 2001, enacted days later by the state legislature, rescheduled primaries to 
September 25, 2001, two weeks after the original primary date.31 The response to reschedule in 
 
21 See id. at 17. 
22 See Election Emergencies, supra note 17. 
23 Id. (“In at least 14 states (Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, 
New York, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin) the legislature has granted the governor power to suspend statutes.”). 
24 Id. (“In 22 more states (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, West 
Virginia) the governor may suspend regulatory statutes, which may include statutes related to elections.”). 
25 Id. (“Kentucky has granted its governor emergency power over some aspect of an election. Seven other states (Florida, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia) have granted their governor emergency power over some aspect of an 
election but also fall into other categories.”). (Emphasis added). 
26 See id. (including a table of election emergency statutes for all fifty states). 
27 Morley, supra note 15. 
28 See generally Terence Neilan, Plane Crashes Collapse World Trade Center Towers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/11/continuous/plane-crashes-collapse-world-trade-center-
towers.html?searchResultPosition=10. 
29 See Adam Nagourney, Pataki Orders Postponement of Primaries Across State, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/day-terror-elections-pataki-orders-postponement-primaries-across-state.html. 
30 Morley, supra note 15, at 554, n.33. 
31 Id. at 554. 
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order to cope with the disaster effectively closed polls until the rescheduled date. However, some 
voters had already been to the polls to cast their votes prior to the closure and others had mailed 
their absentee ballots.32 In an attempt by the Primary Rescheduling Act “to minimize the 
consequences of the disruption,” votes that had been cast in-person on September 11th, prior to 
the closure of polling places, were not counted.33 This meant that voters would have to cast their 
ballots again, even if the polling place where they voted had not been directly impacted by the 
attacks and had retained all of the voter information.34  
 Despite this and other controversies35 that arose as a result of the quick implementation of 
emergency policies, the state acted in a way to best protect the population and ensure the 
opportunity to exercise the fundamental right to vote at a later date. Ultimately, the rescheduled 
primary election had a higher turnout than was expected.36 
 
B. 2012 Presidential Elections and Hurricane Sandy 
 Just over a decade later, as the 2012 Presidential Elections approached, the east coast, 
from the mid-Atlantic to New England, braced for Hurricane Sandy.37 Millions of people 
prepared38 for this “perfect storm.”39 In New York specifically, “370,000 people in low-lying 
communities” were evacuated, the subway shut down, bus service stopped, and the Nasdaq 
exchange closed.40 When Hurricane Sandy did make landfall on October 29, 2012, “[o]ver 2 
million New Jersey residents and 6 million New York residents were left without power and 
approximately 161,000 families were displaced.”41  
 Amid the cleanup and recovery, elected officials held fast to the importance of the 
approaching presidential election on November 6th. According to New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo, “Just because you’re displaced doesn’t mean you should be disenfranchised.”42 Lacking 
an adequate safety plan, “[m]any of [the] adjustments were conceived on the fly, and voting in 
New York and New Jersey was chaotic.”43 With more than 100 polling places changed in New 
York State, the city “was setting up polling places in tents powered by generators and outfitted 
with portable heaters.”44 To encourage voter turnout, the New York Board of Elections 
 
32 See id. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 555. 
35 Id. at 545 (detailing specifically the legal mechanisms election officials used to respond to the September 11 terrorist attacks in 
New York City). 
36 Clifford J. Levy, The New York Primary: The Voters; Primary Turnout Much Higher Than Forecast, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/nyregion/the-new-york-primary-the-voters-primary-turnout-much-higher-than-
forecast.html?searchResultPosition=1. 
37 See generally Marc Santora, Urgent Warnings as Hurricane Sandy Heads to Northeast, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/us/hurricane-sandy-on-collision-course-with-winter-storm.html?searchResultPosition=3. 
38 See generally id. (estimating more than 50 million people from mid-Atlantic to New England anticipated the impact). 
39 See John Schwartz, Early Worries That Hurricane Sandy Could Be a ‘Perfect Storm,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/us/early-worries-that-hurricane-sandy-may-be-a-perfect-
storm.html?searchResultPosition=4 (referring to the similar conditions of the “perfect storm” of 1991). 
40 See James Barron, Sharp Warnings as Hurricane Churns In, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/us/east-coast-braces-for-severe-storm-surge.html?searchResultPosition=1 (detailing the 
storm preparations and cancellations in areas from North Carolina to Connecticut). 
41 Morley, supra note 15, at 564. 
42 David M. Halbfinger et al., Officials Rush to Find Way for the Storm-Tossed to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/nyregion/after-hurricane-sandy-efforts-to-help-the-displaced-vote.html.   
43 Thomas Kaplan, Using Hurricane Sandy as a Lesson for Future Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/nyregion/lessons-from-hurricane-sandy-being-applied-to-election-
planning.html?searchResultPosition=3. 
44 Halbfinger et al., supra note 42.   
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coordinated shuttle buses to bring voters from the hardest hit locations to the polling places.45 
New York and New Jersey also permitted voters who were displaced to use provisional ballots. 
However, the provisional ballots had some restrictions: although voters could cast the 
provisional ballots anywhere in their respective states, in many cases, residents were only able to 
vote in the “statewide contests and in the presidential election.”46  
 Within the response to Hurricane Sandy, the election modifications47 implemented by 
election officials were an effort to protect the opportunity for voters to still exercise their 
fundamental right to vote. However displaced voters encountered obstacles that, in some cases, 
limited the extent to which they could vote. 
  
C. 1942 Midterm Election, 1944 Presidential Election, and Japanese American 
Internment During World War II 
 Creating voting stations within quarantines has also been a historically implemented 
election modification. 48 Two examples illustrate the use and the failure of such a modification. 
The first was absentee voter stations created for incarcerated Japanese Americans during World 
War II.  
 Executive Order 906649 was enacted on February 19, 1942. Under the guise of protecting 
the U.S. “against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense 
premises, and national-defense utilities,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the military 
to designate military areas and exclude persons from those military areas.50 The following 
month, Executive Order 9102, addressing the “necessary” removal of persons “in the interests of 
national security,” established the War Relocation Authority (WRA).51 The two Executive 
Orders led to the forcible removal of “over 120,000 Japanese Americans from the Pacific Coast” 
by the U.S. Government and into one of the ten concentration camps created and operated by the 
WRA.52  
 While quarantined within these concentration camps, Japanese Americans seemingly 
retained their right to vote in the November 1942 midterm election and the 1944 presidential 
election.53 As a workaround to the constitutional stipulation that voters vote in their residence “of 
choice,” which was clearly unachievable since the relocation was a forced removal, the Wartime 
Civil Control Administration announced that “‘qualified citizen evacuees’ – the people held in 
camps – were entitled to the same absentee voting rights as any other citizen who was unable to 
be present at his or her registered polling place.”54 Despite this apparent encouragement to 
engage in the fundamental right, the “right was only nominally intact” due to “racially motivated 
 
45 See id.   
46 Id.   
47 See Morley, supra note 15, at 571 (providing a thorough analysis of election modifications, election postponements, and 
election cancellations using 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane Matthew as examples). 
48 See generally Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and Quarantine Past and Future, 80 TEMP. L. 
REV. 53 (2007) (highlighting specifically how quarantines have historically been used for society to “collectively determine who 
constitutes the community entitled to protection and who becomes defined as an outsider that endangers the community.”). 
49 Exec. Order No. 9066, 5 Fed. Reg. § 1407 (1942).  
50 Id. 
51 Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. § 2165 (1942). 
52 Japanese American Incarceration Facts, JAPANESE AMERICAN NATIONAL MUSEUM, 
http://www.janm.org/nrc/resources/internfs/ (last visited July 8, 2020). 
53 See Natasha Varner, Japanese Americans incarcerated during World War II could still vote, kind of, PUBLIC RADIO 
INTERNATIONAL: THE WORLD (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-10-18/japanese-americans-incarcerated-during-
world-war-ii-were-still-allowed-vote-kind. 
54 See Varner, supra note 53. 
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intervention and inadequate voter education.”55 For example, in 1942, a report stated “that less 
than 100 Nisei56 voted” in Los Angeles, despite 2,000 absentee ballots being sent to voters.57 
This discrepancy was likely a reflection of “poll watchers” who would “challeng[e] ‘every ballot 
sent in by anyone with a Japanese name.’”58 Additionally, following the lead of Wyoming’s 
Attorney General, a number of states prior to the 1944 presidential elections “determined that all 
incarcerees should again register in their precincts of origin since they did not meet the legal 
requirements for establishing domesticity in the states where they were imprisoned,” creating 
clear boundaries to eligible voters.59  
 Thus, despite the appearance of providing the ability to vote during a national crisis by 
implementing election modifications in the form of polling stations, voters were disenfranchised. 
  
D. 1918 Midterm Election and the Flu Pandemic 
 The second example of a specially created polling place for quarantined individuals 
occurred during the 1918 flu pandemic. Referred to as the Spanish Flu,60 the virus raged through 
the global community, infecting about one-third of the world’s population and eventually killing 
around 675,000 people in the United States.61 Simultaneously, the U.S. prepared for the 
November 5, 1918 midterm election.62 
 The attempt and failure of a specially created polling place was detailed in the case 
Harper v. Dotson.63 In the weeks leading to the elections, public gatherings were banned, 
quarantines were placed, and fear rose regarding the pandemic’s impact on voter turnout.64 In 
early November 1918, students and teachers at the Albion Normal School were quarantined on 
campus.65 The county board of commissioners permitted the installation of “a special precinct in 
the school so [the voters in quarantine] could vote.”66 The county registrar removed the voters at 
the school from the list of registered voters and created “a separate list for the precinct at the 
school.”67 The special precinct at the school was observed on Election Day by judges.68 Despite 
 
55 Id. 
56 Nisei, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nisei (“[A] son or daughter of Japanese 
immigrants who is born and educated in America and especially in the U.S..”) 
57 Varner, supra note 53. 
58 Id. See also ASIAN AMS. ADVANCING JUSTICE, ASIAN AMERICANS FACE HIGHER THAN AVERAGE VOTE-BY-MAIL BALLOT 
REJECTION RATES IN CALIFORNIA 1 (Aug. 2017), https://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/issuebrief-vbm-FINAL-
1.pdf (providing a contemporary look at Asian American absentee ballot rejections, typically due to signature mismatch). 
59 Varner, supra note 53 (discussing the election regulations added in 1944 that “made it inordinately difficult to cast a ballot.” 
Also discussing race-based voter disenfranchisement). See also Ari Berman, Texas's Voter-Registration Laws Are Straight Out of 
the Jim Crow Playbook, THE NATION (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/texass-voter-registration-laws-
are-straight-out-of-the-jim-crow-playbook/; Ari Berman, GOP States Keep Ignoring Court Orders to Restore Voting Rights, THE 
NATION (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/gop-states-keep-ignoring-court-orders-to-restore-voting-
rights/. 
60 See Becky Little, As the 1918 Flu Emerged, Cover-Up and Denial Helped It Spread, HISTORY (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.history.com/news/1918-pandemic-spanish-flu-censorship (explaining how Spain was the first to report flu cases, 
which led to incorrect assumptions that the flu originated in Spain). 
611918 Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-pandemic-
h1n1.html (last visited July 1, 2020). 
62 See Jason Marisam, Judging the 1918 Election, 9 ELECTION L.J. 141, 141, n.2 (2010). 
63 187 P. 270 (Idaho 1920). 
64 See Marisam, supra note 62, at 141 (offering a thorough review of the lead up to the 1918 election). 
65 See id. at 147 (“The Normal School’s reports do not indicate why they were quarantined, but there are two plausible 
explanations: either bouts of flu were reported at the school or someone living on campus had left Cassia County and, after 
returning, the county isolated all those in contact with the traveler”). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See id. 
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this apparently eligible process, the votes were ultimately thrown out. Since the board of county 
commissioners had established the courthouse as the sole designated polling place for the 
precinct, the addition of a polling place within the precinct at the Normal School after the board 
meeting and prior to the election was in direct conflict with the election statute.69 The court held 
that “[s]ince the statute expressly provides that the thing which was done shall not be done, we 
conclude the violation renders the election invalid.”70 Thus, the attempted modification to ensure 
that quarantined voters could exercise their fundamental right proved ineffective. 
 The 1918 election bears a striking similarity to the current situation in the U.S.. The 1918 
flu pandemic was first detected in March 1918, leading to an estimated 195,000 deaths in the 
U.S. by October.71 While waiting for a vaccine, the Surgeon General and head of the U.S. Public 
Health Service initially recommended minimal measures like “bed rest for flu-like symptoms.”72 
Measures changed focus, from the individual to the general public, as the Surgeon General soon 
after advised “the public to avoid needless crowding and sneezing.”73 When the death toll spiked 
in October, a bulletin was issued advising a ban on “public gathering,” which prompted church, 
theater, and saloon closures.74 Still, the 1918 election went ahead, with some locations even 
lifting quarantines, like Washington DC, in time for the polls to open days later.75 “The San 
Francisco Chronicle called the event ‘the first masked ballot ever known in the history of 
America’”76 and other newspapers touted how “De Kalb women braved the flu-filled air and 
turned out in high numbers.”77 With emphasis on the “importance of wartime voting” and 
unfounded reassurances that “[t]he utmost precautions against influenza infection [were] taken at 
every polling place,” the election, with in-person voting, commenced as planned.78  
 In retrospect, permitting the election to continue as normal had severe impacts on the 
franchise and the nation’s health. Firstly, there was a decline in voter turnout in 1918 compared 
to the 1914 midterm election.79 Shockingly, “[if] just a fraction of the drop” was in response to 
the flu’s presence, “then the disease was responsible for hundreds of thousands of people not 
voting.”80 Secondly, studies now show that “[t]he cities that followed [] interventions by closing 
schools, banning public gatherings, isolating flu patients and placing in quarantine people 
exposed to them, suffered less than the cities that chose not to enforce these measures."81 
Infection rates coincided with states’ lifting of quarantines in time for the election.82 In Nebraska, 
 
69 See Harper v. Dotson, 187 P. 270, 271 (Idaho 1920) (“The board [of commissioners] may from time to time change the 
boundaries of, create new or consolidate established precincts, but they must not alter or change any election precinct or change 
the place of holding election in any precinct after their regular July meeting next preceding any election: Provided, that the 
precincts established and the places designated in which to hold elections at the time of the taking effect of this chapter shall so 
remain until changed.”). 
70 Id. 
71 1918 Pandemic Timeline, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-
pandemic-h1n1.html (last visited July 8, 2020). 
72 Marisam, supra note 62, at 142. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 144. 
76 See id. at 145. 
77 See id. at 144-145 (referring to New York women who would be voting in their first statewide election). 
78 See id. at 145. 
79 See id. at 146. 
80 See id. 
81 Howard Markel et al., Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by U.S. Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza 
Pandemic, 298 JAMA 644, 644 (2007). 
82 See Kristin Watkins, It Came Across the Plains: The 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Rural Nebraska 35 (Dec. 18, 2015) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska) (on file with University of Nebraska Medical Center) 
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local newspapers “not[ed] lifting of the quarantine [] had the greatest number of obituaries and 
notices of illness of influenza or pneumonia” illustrating “how the political machine disregarded 
the health and safety of its citizens to the advantage of the government.”83 In an attempt to 
normalize by permitting in-person voting as if during a typical election year, the 1918 election 
resulted in lower voter turnout and a spike in influenza cases and deaths. 
 
E. Takeaways: Protecting the Public and Preserving Voting Rights 
 In the historical examples presented, states offered crisis-specific accommodations – 
some were successful while others were ineffective - for voters to cast their ballots. Importantly, 
the measures used in prior crises would not be appropriate in the present crisis. The fluidity of 
COVID-19 and the unique state responses make it difficult to prepare for the extensiveness of 
the pandemic in November, however, the CDC’s national forecast84 paints a grim picture of the 
likely climbing death toll. The decision by the Trump Administration to intervene in COVID-19 
data collection85 adds another troublesome layer. Since the pandemic is not restricted to one area 
of the U.S. and spread occurs unknowingly by asymptomatic people in crowds, adjusting the 
election’s date, time, or location of polling places would not be effective. Undoubtedly, the 
choice to permit voters to gather at polling locations during the 1918 flu, which had deadly 
consequences, is a worthy lesson to learn from. 
 Even though the measures used in prior crises are not applicable during the COVID-19 
pandemic, in highlighting historical examples of elections during emergencies, there are two 
important distinctions to be made. First, priority fell on protecting the general public. Second, if 
there was an opportunity to preserve the fundamental right of voting through election 
modification, in the midst of responding to the emergency, that option was implemented.  
 
II. ORIGINS OF ABSENTEE BALLOTS AND MAIL VOTING 
 The Constitution grants each state legislature the power to determine “times, places and 
manner of holding elections,” permitting Congress to alter the regulations.86 Thus, regulations 
for voting, arguably one of the most important rights of an American citizen,87 are created within 
a system siloed to the individual states. 
 The movement for an absentee ballot in the U.S. dates to the Civil War. Absentee ballots 
were implemented to ensure soldiers away from home could still vote.88 In fact, this concept has 
since developed into federal law. Under the 1986 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 




83 Id.  
84 Forecasts of Total Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-
data/forecasting-us.html (last updated Jul. 15, 2020). 
85 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump Administration Strips C.D.C. of Control of Coronavirus Data, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus.html (“The Trump administration has ordered hospitals 
to bypass the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and send all Covid-19 patient information to a central database in 
Washington beginning on Wednesday. The move has alarmed health experts who fear the data will be politicized or withheld 
from the public.”). 
86 U.S. CONST. art. I §4, cl. 1. 
87 See Brian Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1519, 1533-1534 (2003) (citing survey determining that 93.2% of survey respondents believe that the right to vote is either 
the most important or one of the most important rights in democracy). 
88 See e.g. John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 492 (2003) (visiting the origins of the Australian Ballot and the Absentee Ballot). 
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Act (MOVE Act), state officials are required to provide military and overseas voters with voter 
registration and absentee ballot applications.89  
 In addition to its original purpose, absentee voting has a long history of development and 
application in every state. In early Florida absentee law, the state’s Supreme Court called 
absentee voting “an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions” that was intended to 
provide only military personnel or civilians “whose duties as such made it impracticable for them 
to attend their polling places on the day of the election” the opportunity to vote.90 The court 
clarified that absentee voting “was not intended as a convenience for those who absented 
themselves on account of pleasure or free will.”91 On the other hand, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, acknowledging that absentee voting was established during war to ensure the 
enfranchisement of individuals engaged in military service, further noted that “the methods of its 
exercise have progressively undergone legislative renovations” and “the availability of the 
privilege has been modernly enlarged to encircle its use in periods of peace, and also by 
specifically qualified civilians.”92 Therefore, what started as an option during war expanded to 
times of peace. 
 While the name absentee voting implies on its own that the voter be absent, absentee 
voting laws have developed to the extent that the voter need not be physically outside of the 
voting location on Election Day. Specifically, in Wood v. State, the Texas Court of Appeals 
considered it vital to the case that the state’s original absentee voter statute included the phrase 
“expects to be absent” and maintained this phrase despite being amended twice.93 The statute in 
question, an updated version of the original absentee voter statute, replaced “expects to be 
absent” with “is absent.”94 The lower court determined from this change that an individual must 
indeed be outside of the voting location on Election Day for the absentee vote to count.95 
However, in one line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals argued that this was an “impracticable 
and unworkable” interpretation of the law.96 If courts in general were to follow the lower court’s 
reasoning, then “[e]very absentee vote would be the subject of much uncertainty, and every 
election contest would involve the issue of finding out whether or not each absentee voter was, in 
fact, absent on election day.”97 This would “lead[] to such confusion [that] should not be 
indulged in, unless there is not escape therefrom.”98 Thus, absentee is in the name, but is not 
required. 
 As absentee voting continually develops in election law, courts have wrestled with 
whether absentee voting is a privilege or a right.99 In the case McDonald v. Board. Of Elections 
Commissioners, which addressed whether it was constitutional for Illinois’ absentee voter laws 
to declare unsentenced county jail inmates who were awaiting trial not eligible to cast absentee 
 
89 The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/uniformed-and-
overseas-citizens-absentee-voting-act (last visited Jul. 9, 2020). 
90 State ex rel. Whitley v. Rinehart, 140 Fla. 645, 652 (1939). 
91 Id. 
92 De Flesco v. Mercer County Board of Elections, 129 A.2d 38, 40 (N.J. 1957). 
93 126 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 
94 Wood v. State 126 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 




99 See generally Berman, Texas's Voter-Registration Laws Are Straight Out of the Jim Crow Playbook, supra note 59 (comparing 
Texas and Oregon registration and voter laws. “At a time when states like Texas continue to make it harder to vote, Oregon is not 
just registering a lot of new voters but reframing the national debate over voting rights—treating the franchise as a fundamental 
right rather than a privilege.”). 
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ballots, the U.S. Supreme Court referred to absentee ballots as a “claimed right.”100 The Court, 
holding that this “claimed right” is not equivalent to the constitutional right to vote, reasoned that 
“the absentee statutes, which are designed to make voting more available to some groups who 
cannot easily get to the polls, do not themselves deny appellants the exercise of the franchise.”101 
State courts have held similarly with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which reasoned that 
absentee voting “has the characteristics of a privilege rather than of a right” because “[w]hen, 
where, and how the voting is to take place are matters prescribed and governed by the will of the 
Legislature.”102 In another example, the court in Anderson v. North Carolina State Board of 
Election specified that the North Carolina General Statutes consider “vote by mail-in absentee 
ballot” to be “an alternative to voting in person,”103 not a replacement for the right itself. 
 Currently, all states permit some type of absentee voting, also called a vote-by-mail ballot 
option.104 Thirty-four states and Washington D.C.105 offer “no-excuse” absentee voting, meaning 
a voter need not provide an excuse when requesting a mail ballot.106 Of those thirty-four, five 
states have all-mail voting.107 In all-mail elections, each registered voter receives a ballot in the 
mail during an “election period,” and returns the ballot in the mail in a “secrecy envelop or 
sleeve” within a regular mailing envelope.108 Voters also sign an affidavit.109 Despite all 
registered voters receiving ballots in the mail, states still maintain an in-person voting option on 
Election Day.110 Notably, some states have statutory provisions that permit counties to opt to 
implement all-mail elections or allow some elections to be all-mail elections.111 The remaining 
states offer excuse absentee ballots, which require that the voter requesting the absentee ballot 
fall into one of the eligible excuse categories. While all states permit absentee voting for voters 
who will be outside of the county on Election Day and for voters who are aware prior to the 
election that an illness or disability will prevent the voter from going to the polls, states vary in 
additional accepted excuses.112 Examples of additional excuses include voters who are election 
or poll workers, voters over a specified age, and voters whose religious practices prevent them 
 
100 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (Emphasis added). 
101 Id. 
102 De Flesco v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 129 A.2d 38, 40 (N.J. 1957). 
103 788 S.E.2d 179, 182 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §163-226 (West 2020) (example of a no-excuse 
absentee voting statute). 
104 See generally Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at Home Options, National Conference 
of State Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-
early-voting.aspx (last updated June 22, 2020) (explaining terminology to clarify the use of “absentee ballot” and various similar 
terms. “Some states refer to ‘advance ballots,’ ‘mailed ballots,’ ‘by-mail ballots,’ ‘mail ballots’ or ‘vote-by-mail ballots.’”). 
105 Id. (last updated June 22, 2020) (listing the 34 states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming). 
106 See VOPP: Table 1: States with No-Excuse Absentee Voting, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopp-table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting.aspx (last updated 
May 1, 2020). 
107 See Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at Home Options, supra note 104 (listing the 5 
states: Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §1-5-401 (West 2014)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §11-101 (West 2019)), Oregon 
(OR. REV. STAT. §254.465 (West 2008)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §20A-3a-202 (West 2020)), and Washington (WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §29A.40.010 (West 2013)). It is noteworthy that the Utah statute was formerly cited as UTAH CODE ANN. §20A-3a-








from going to a polling place on the day of the election.113 Many states have created statutes that 
permit absentee voting for individuals experiencing a personal emergency. These statutes 
vary.114 For example, a Connecticut statute115 permits a designated person to deliver an absentee 
application to the clerk on behalf of a voter who is hospitalized within six days of the election 
and in Nevada, if a voter is “suddenly hospitalized, becomes seriously ill or is called away from 
home after the time has elapsed for requesting an absent ballot,”116 then the voter can request an 
absent ballot, which is delivered by the clerk. 
 Absentee ballots have developed since the Civil War, initially to preserve the 
enfranchisement of military personnel and then to ensure the enfranchisement of civilians with 
special circumstances or established excuses. This election modification, though not a 
replacement for the right to vote, has provided an opportunity for voters to exercise their 
fundamental right when extenuating factors prevent them from being present at the polls.  
 
III. THE ACTUAL THREAT AND THE PERCEIVED THREAT 
 As discussed in Part I, the election modifications implemented in prior crises were crisis-
specific. Part II described the foundation of absentee voting and, additionally, illustrated how 
absentee voting has expanded with time and necessity. The issue now is how to protect the 
public while ensuring a successful presidential election during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
remembering the words of Judge Brennan, “[a]fter each perceived security crisis ended, the 
United States has remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary” 
because these perceived crises “are often overblown and factually unfounded.” 117 Before 
discussing the contemporary countermeasure that will protect public health and safety during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, while also ensuring voters can exercise their right to vote in November, 
the actual security crises and the perceived security crises must be distinguished. 
  
A. ACTUAL THREAT: COVID-19 AND PUBLIC SAFETY 
 The response to COVID-19 fell short in multiple ways, primarily with delayed 
acknowledgment of the virus’s threat in the U.S. and failure to provide testing measures.118 
President Trump declared a national emergency beginning March 1, 2020.119 The U.S. ordered 
 
113 See VOPP: Table 2: Excuses to Vote Absentee, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/vopp-table-2-excuses-to-vote-absentee.aspx (last updated Apr. 20, 2020) (listing a summary of acceptable state 
excuses). 
114 See generally Absentee Voting in Case of a Personal Emergency, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-voting-in-case-of-a-personal-emergency.aspx (last updated July 
10, 2020) (listing Emergency Absentee Voting options by state). 
115 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §9-150c (West 1998). 
116 NEV. REV. STATE. ANN. §2903.316 (West 2017). 
117 Brennan, Jr., supra note 1, at 11. 
118 See Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html?searchResultPosition=1 (explaining how the 
lack of U.S. testing delayed response meant containment was not an option). See also Chad Terhune, Special Report: How Korea 
trounced U.S. in race to test people for coronavirus, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-testing-specialrep/special-report-how-korea-trounced-u-s-in-race-to-test-people-for-coronavirus-
idUSKBN2153BW?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=twitter (comparing South Korea’s quick response time to the coronavirus 
in manufacturing and providing test kits to U.S.’s delayed response that severely impacted the virus’ spread); Alexis C. Madrigal, 
How the Coronavirus Became an American Catastrophe, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 21, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-many-americans-are-sick-lost-february/608521/ (commenting on how 
the lack of testing prevented possibility of containment and on how the U.S. COVID-19 response was inadequate). 
119 Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020). 
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federal quarantines for specified travelers120 and states issued shelter-in-place orders varying in 
severity and length.121 However, insufficient U.S. testing obstructed an accurate case count. 
Then, testing started. In March, “confirmed cases in the United States increased at a rapid 
clip.”122 Cases passed 100 on March 5th, jumped to 1,000 less than one week later, climbed to 
10,000 on March 18th, and by March 27th, tests revealed 100,000 cases.123 This steep rise 
“reflect[ed] in part that [U.S.] testing capacity had begun to catch up with reality on the 
ground.”124 By early July, the U.S. had reported 3,296,599 total cases and 134,884 total 
deaths.125 The state of Florida had surpassed the total number of infections and deaths of entire 
countries.126 On July 11th, Florida reported 15,300 cases, breaking the record for single day new 
cases in any state.127 With infection numbers continuing to climb, the U.S. is deep into a 
pandemic period.128 
 Nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPI) have been implemented by multiple states as a 
measure to protect the public during COVID-19. Studies of the 1918 flu pandemic show how 
“sustained nonpharmaceutical interventions” benefitted the cities that used them and showed a 
stark contrast against the cities that did not. 129 “Cities that implemented nonpharmaceutical 
interventions earlier experienced associated delays in the time to peak mortality, reductions in 
the magnitude of the peak mortality, and decreases in the total mortality burden.”130 The NPIs 
used in 1918 primarily consisted of public grade school through high school closures (with 
private schools and parochial schools generally independently following), public gathering bans, 
quarantines and isolations, and other adjustments to public operations, such as altering business 
hours, requiring face masks, or restricting transportation.131 The NPIs implemented to protect 
 
120 See, e.g., Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Issues Federal Quarantine to Repatriated U.S. Citizens 
at March Air Reserve Base (Jan. 31, 2020) (on file with author), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0131-federal-
quarantine-march-air-reserve-base.html. 
121 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 33-20 (2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-
COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER.pdf (directing all California residents to stay home “except as needed”); Exec. Order No. 202.6 
(2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO202.6.pdf (cancelling non-essential gatherings 
and closing non-essential businesses under the “New York State on PAUSE” order); Jiachuan Wu et al., Stay-at-home orders 
across the country, NBC News (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/here-are-stay-home-orders-
across-country-n1168736 (last updated Apr. 29, 2020). 
122 Philip A. Wallach & Justus Myers, The federal government’s coronavirus response – Public health timeline, BROOKINGS 




125 Cases and Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-
updates/us-cases-deaths.html (last updated July 13, 2020). 
126 See Holly Yan et al., Florida has more Covid-19 than most countries in the world. These stats show how serious the problem 
is, CNN: HEALTH, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/13/health/florida-coronavirus-cases-comparisons/index.html (last updated July 
13, 2020, 4:14 PM). 
127 See id. 
128 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.’S, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, 1, 1 (2005), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
resources/pdf/hhspandemicinfluenzaplan.pdf (explaining how The Pandemic Influenza Plan, which was created in response to 
President George W. Bush’s response to rising fear in the 2000s about a mutated avian flu, used the term “Pandemic Period” to 
specify the time after extensive spread of an outbreak when applying “control measures” is no longer applicable. Instead, the 
“Pandemic Period” requires measures beyond an individual quarantine and shifts attention to measures that decrease social 
contact at a group and community level.) 
129 Markel et al., supra note 81, at 651 (“The combination and choice of nonpharmaceutical interventions also appeared to be 
critical as confirmed by the multivariate model.”). 
130 Id. at 648. See George P. Smith, Re-Shaping the Common Good in Times of Public Health Emergencies: Validating Medical 
Triage, 18 ANNALS HEALTH. 1, 18-19 n.141 (2009) (“A recent study confirmed that nonpharmaceutical interventions used by 
forty-three cities during the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic had a salutary effect on the management of the emergency.”). 
131 See Markel et al., supra note 81, at 651. 
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against COVID-19 have primarily consisted of shelter-in-place orders, comparable to a “snow-
day” option.132 California, the first state to issue the stay-at-home order on March 19th, permitted 
only workers who fell within one of sixteen133 essential operations needed to maintain continuity 
of operations of the federal infrastructure sectors, to continue work. Other states quickly 
followed.134 In addition to social-distancing and shelter-in-place, by July, more than twenty 
states had issued mandatory mask requirements, with a few states issuing mandates by specific 
counties seeing “case rate[s] surpass[ing] government thresholds.”135 In Arizona, even Governor 
Doug Ducey, a longtime advocate of maintaining a statewide standard to “reduce confusion” by 
“prohibiting local officials from imposing health requirements any stricter than what the state 
allowed - including a mandate for the use of masks,” acknowledged the spike of statewide cases 
in June and July and rescinded the ban.136 
 Despite the use of NPIs, the U.S. is preparing for the anticipated worse second wave137 
while the first wave still rages on.138 Research of the 1918 flu pandemic suggests not only that 
NPIs were beneficial, but also that it was necessary for these interventions to “be ‘on’ throughout 
the particular peak of a local experience”139 in order to have the desired impact. Specifically, 
studies show that second waves of the 1918 influenza “frequently followed the sequential 
activation, deactivation, and reactivation of nonpharmaceutical interventions, highlighting the 
transient protective nature of nonpharmaceutical interventions, and the needs for a sustained 
response.”140 In short, research141 suggests that applying multiple and consistent 
 
132 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.’S, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 128, at 1, SB-11, SB-12 (describing 
“snow days” or “self-shielding” as a request that the entire community stay home. The Pandemic Influenza Plan notes that snow 
days “may be instituted for an initial 10-day period,” followed by a situational assessment). 
133 See Identifying Critical Infrastructure During COVID-19, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, 
https://www.cisa.gov/identifying-critical-infrastructure-during-covid-19 (last updated May 28, 2020) (specifying the essential 
critical infrastructure workers: Chemical, Communications, Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Defense 
Industrial Base, Emergency Services, Energy, Financial, Food & Agriculture, Financial, Government Facilities, Healthcare & 
Public Health, Information Technology, Nuclear Reactors, Materials & Waste, Transportation Systems, and Water). 
134 See Wu et al., supra note 121 (summarizing stay-at-home orders for each state and providing hyperlinks to the official 
announcements). 
135 Bill Chappel, More Than 20 U.S. States Now Require Face Masks in Public, NPR (July 10, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/07/10/889691823/more-than-20-u-s-states-now-require-face-masks-
in-public. 
136 Steven Goldstein et al., Gov. Ducey Says Arizona Mayors Allowed to Require Face Masks, KJZZ, 
https://kjzz.org/content/1592974/gov-ducey-says-arizona-mayors-allowed-require-face-masks (last updated June 18, 2020, 12:53 
PM). See id. 
137 See, e.g., Jen Christensen, Second wave of COVID-19 in the fall could be much worse than the current wave, infectious 
disease expert says, CNN: WORLD (June 26, 2020, 1:48 AM) https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-06-
26-20-intl/h_91c3650ccdb74a005c5dbdcfebdc4953. 
138 See Nurith Aizeman, Coronavirus 2nd Wave? Nope, The U.S. Is Still Stuck In The 1st One, NPR (June 12, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/06/12/876224115/coronavirus-second-wave-nope-were-still-stuck-in-the-first-
one; Erika Edwards, Is this the second wave of COVID-19 in the U.S.? Or are we still in the first?, NBC NEWS (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/second-wave-covid-19-u-s-or-are-we-still-n1231087.  
139 Markel et al., supra note 81, at 651 (“The combination and choice of nonpharmaceutical interventions also appeared to be 
critical as confirmed by the multivariate model.”). 
140 Id. at 653. 
141 See id. (“Further, our retrospective study is consistent with the results from recent theoretical models of the spread of a 
contemporary pandemic, which highlight the value of early, combined, and sustained nonpharmaceutical interventions to mitigate 
a pandemic), specificity (best demonstrated in cities with bimodal mortality peaks when the triggers were activated, deactivated, 
and reactivated), temporality (interventions always preceded the reduction of EDR), dose response (layering and increased 
duration of the nonpharmaceutical interventions were associated with better outcomes), biological plausibility (these 
interventions reduce person-to-person interactions and biologically would be expected to reduce the spread of a communicable 
agent such as influenza), coherence (our data align with the established body of knowledge on the epidemiology of influenza), 
and analogy (isolation and social distancing have been demonstrated as effective means of preventing person-to-person spread of 
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nonpharmaceutical measures is beneficial in lessening the overall impact of a spreading 
pandemic and reduces deaths. Instead of heeding this warning, a series of states began lifting the 
shelter-in-place orders in June, rolling back restrictions by reintroducing dine-in options and 
permitting indoor activities142 when U.S. COVID-19 cases were still lingering around 20,000 on 
a seven-day average.143 As was feared and predicted, restriction roll backs opened the door to 
surging coronavirus cases.144 States have since halted reopening plans.145 A COVID-19 vaccine 
does not currently exist. Even with a vaccine discovery and implementation, it is “‘unlikely’ that 
the U.S. will achieve sufficient levels of immunity to quell the outbreak” since polls reflect that 
many Americans will choose to not be vaccinated once it is available.146 
 Even though President Trump has consistently downplayed the global pandemic, 
postulating that “cases are young people that would heal in a day” and merely have “the 
sniffles,”147 COVID-19 poses a severe and real threat. Since voting by mail ballot is done 
remotely, it sustains the use of NPIs and serves as an effective countermeasure to COVID-19.  
 
B. PERCEIVED THREAT: VOTER FRAUD 
 A statement on Georgia’s Secretary of State’s webpage, released prior to the May 19th 
primary election, explained “[w]ith social distancing as the most important tool for limiting the 
spread of coronavirus, providing alternatives to voting in person is crucial.”148 Accordingly, 
Georgia’s Secretary of State, Brad Raffensperger, issued absentee ballot request forms to 6.9 
million voters to prevent crowding at polling places and highlighted steps needed to protect 
election workers and voters that must vote in person.149 Meanwhile, President Trump honed his 
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attacks on mail-voting. While making remarks about protecting seniors with diabetes, President 
Trump claimed that “[p]eople that aren’t citizens, illegals” receive mail-ballots150 and two days 
later, while making remarks about preventing online censorship, President Trump further insisted 
that “anybody in California that’s breathing, gets a ballot.”151 The following month, during a 
visit to Arizona, he even “suggested at one point that mail carriers could be held up as they 
delivered ballots, which could then be counterfeited by enemies foreign and domestic.”152 
Shortly after, he took to Twitter, “issu[ing] attacks . . . on Democratic-led states like Michigan 
and Nevada, claiming that their efforts to encourage voters to cast a by-mail ballot are ‘illegal’ 
actions that contribute to ‘voter fraud.’”153 As of June, President Trump had laid blame on 
Democrats five times for “rigging” elections by use of mail-voting.154 
 President Trump’s assertions, though dramatized, are not original. Concerns have 
surrounded absentee ballots since the early days of voting, with fears of voter fraud heightening 
in recent decades. For example, in one opinion from the 1930s, the majority wrote that 
“[e]lection laws should be construed liberally in favor of the right to vote but this is not the rule 
as to absentee voting laws.”155 Instead, the majority claimed, absentee voting, “[b]eing in 
derogation of the common law, [] should be strictly construed. The reason for the difference is 
that purity of the ballot is more difficult to preserve when voting absent than when voting in 
person.”156  
 Recent studies show that absentee voter fraud is minimal. As discussed earlier, absentee 
voting began during the Civil War and contemporary changes have been made by states. In 
November 2000, Oregon became the first all vote-by-mail state in the U.S..157 While holding 
office as Oregon’s Secretary of State, Bill Bradbury vocalized his state’s vote-by-mail system’s 
success citing, among other points, that while critics argue that vote-by-mail is prone to fraud, 
signature verification is a successful safeguard. Additionally, Bradbury highlighted the voter-
friendliness of vote-by-mail, the cost-saving measures, and voter turnout.158  
 According to the Vote at Home Institute, over 250 million votes have been cast through 
mail-in ballots in all fifty states since 2000.159 Additionally, in 2018 alone, over thirty-one 
million voters cast their ballots by mail, representing 25.8% of the election participants.160 
“Arizona, California, Montana, North Dakota, and Utah saw by-mail voting rates above 50.0 
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percent in many counties. In addition, counties in Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Main, and Wyoming 
had by-mail voting rates between 25.0 percent and 50.0 percent in the 2018 general elections.”161 
 This increase in mail-voting has not been accompanied with confirmed accounts of voter 
fraud.162 In fact, The Heritage Foundation, which maintains a database of election fraud cases, 
has assembled a mere 206 confirmed cases of “fraudulent use of absentee ballots” since 1988.163 
This may, in part, be a result of effectively implemented types of mail-voting security. 
 The Brennan Center for Justice, in a report summarizing tools used to protect elections 
against fraud, highlighted updated technologies that enhance security to ensure integrity for 
elections.164 The seven tools highlighted are identity verification, bar codes, ballot tracking 
through the U.S. Postal Service, secure drop-off locations and drop boxes, harsh penalties, 
postelection audits, and polling sites as a fail-safe.165 Identity verification, which is considered “a 
long-standing and well-established practice to ensure that the ballot received was indeed cast by 
the correct voter” matches specific identifying information against voter rolls.166 Bar codes are 
used to allow voters to track that their ballot was received, but also helps states keep track of 
individual ballots to avoid accidental or intentional duplicates.167 Intelligent Mail Barcodes 
(IMB)168 support tracking mail pieces through the U.S. Postal Service so voters can monitor their 
ballot en route to the appropriate election office and election officials can check on the status of 
ballots mailed to voters to ensure arrival or, if lost in the mail, appropriately send a replacement 
without possible duplication.169 Secure drop off locations, which may not be feasible during the 
pandemic but is a commonly used return option, not only ensures a voter that their ballot was 
received, but is also monitored by security measures, like pre-installed security cameras on 
government office buildings overlooking the drop box.170 Awareness of harsh penalties 
additionally discourages individuals to participate in voter fraud, not only “because fraud by 
individual voters is a singularly foolish and ineffective way to attempt to win an election,” but 
primarily due to prison time and fines under state penalties by risking such action.171 Post-
election audits “systematically enable election officials to identify any irregularities of 
misconduct” by reviewing samples of ballots, which is conducive to mail-voting which always 
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provides paper records of each vote.172 Lastly, in-person polling sites, which continue to operate 
as an option for those who choose not to vote by mail, are viewed as a “fail-safe.”173 
 In sum, measures already in place have successfully prevented mail-voting fraud. Claims 
of mail-voting fraud are unsupported and, at best, a weak argument against universalizing a 
longstanding, dependable option to exercise the franchise.  
 
C. PERCEIVED THREAT: LEFT-LEANING ABSENTEE VOTING   
 In addition to President Trump’s baseless claims surrounding mail-voting fraud, he has 
also strongly advocated that mail-voting favors the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. 
In an April tweet, he warned that “Republicans should fight very hard when it comes to state 
wide mail-in voting” because it “doesn’t work out well for Republicans.”174 
 Studies show the outcomes of mail-voting are bipartisan. The data presented and gathered 
from normal election years in three states175 - California, Utah, and Washington - prior to the 
pandemic, conclude that “vote-by-mail modestly increases participation while not advantaging 
either party.176 Specifically, “[t]he expansion of vote-by-mail does not appear to tilt turnout 
towards the Democratic party, nor does it appear to affect election outcomes meaningfully.177 
Additionally, evidence shows that “turnout increased in the year immediately following the 
introduction of vote-by-mail and turnout was not meaningfully higher before the counties 
adopted voting by mail.178 Therefore, mail-voting has historically expanded voter turnout 
without benefitting one party over the other. 
 Surveys have also demonstrated general voter support for mail-in voting to ensure a safe 
election amid COVID-19. As of early April, 79% of Democrats and 65% of Republicans, 
making up 72% of adults in the U.S., supported implementation of mail-voting for the 2020 
general election as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.179 
 There is also bipartisan support illustrated by state officials. In the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia, comprehensive research found that forty-six states offer a form of mail-
voting for all voters without an excuse, meaning that both Democratic-led and Republican-led 
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states either already offered no-excuse voting or “recently issued policy changes to loosen 
restrictions on ‘excuses’ required to obtain an absentee ballot, directly in response to COVID-19 
concerns.”180 Notably, these adjustments were made prior to primary season and policy changes 
may not be maintained or reinstated for the November general election. “For example, in several 
states that recently issued policies stating that COVID-19 health concerns (including the desire to 
self-isolate) are valid reasons to request an absentee ballot, the states also placed a ‘sunset’ on 
those policies, to clarify that they are valid only for elections before November.”181 Of the forty-
six states that offer mail-voting for all voters, whether the states already offered all-mail voting, 
no-excuse mail voting, or adjusted restrictions in response to COVID-19, twenty-four states have 
a Democratic governor and twenty-two have a Republican governor.182 The remaining four states 
still requiring excuses to vote by mail - Missouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas – have 
Republican governors.183 This demonstrates two important points: Democratic and Republican 
state officials believe COVID-19 is an actual threat and Democratic and Republican state 
officials believe mail-voting is a reliable option.  
 Despite claims that mail-voting favors the Democratic Party, studies prove that mail-
voting does not favor one political party over the other. Furthermore, state action prior to the 
primary elections prove that state officials generally find mail-voting to be a reliable option and 
believe COVID-19 to be a legitimate reason for election modifications. Unfortunately, the 
sunsets placed on some of the policies demonstrate that, though some states were willing to 
expand mail-voting for the primaries, states may not make the same accommodations for the 
presidential election, echoing state action in 1918 when “the political machine disregarded the 
health and safety of its citizens to the advantage of the government.”184 
 
D. ACTUAL THREAT: DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF MINORITY VOTERS 
 Although the accusations of mail-voting fraud and Democratic-leaning outcomes are 
unfounded, there are legitimate concerns that mail-voting disenfranchises specific populations of 
voters. Certain minority populations and primarily non-white voters have historically 
encountered frequent accessibility issues and higher numbers of invalidated ballots. 
 
1. Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters 
 A foundational issue of voting, thereby affecting the accessibility of mail-voting, is 
implicit bias, which impacts the way election officials educate potential voters.185 In a University 
of Southern California study, researchers assessed the responsiveness of legislators to 
hypothetical white and Latino constituents.186 In one experiment, researches sent e-mails two 
weeks prior to the November 4, 2012 general election to legislators in fourteen states with high 
Latino populations.187 The e-mails asked a basic question about whether a driver’s license would 
be required to vote on Election Day, to which “every legislator could simply respond with a ‘no’ 
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answer.”188 There were four groups: an English-language white-named (Jacob Smith) control 
group, an English-language Latino-named (Santiago Rodriguez) group, a Spanish-language 
white-named group, and a Spanish-language Latino-named group.189 The study showed that 
legislators sent responses to half of the control group but only sent responses to 44.3% of the 
English-language Latino-named group.190 The study additionally showed that legislators had a 
low response rate to the Spanish-language groups, with responses to 12.8% to the white-named 
constituents and 10.3% to the Latino-named constituents.191 The results found a correlation 
between legislators who supported voter identification laws and the response rate, noting strong 
evidence that legislators who support ID laws will “much more likely respond to white 
constituents’ requests for information about voting than they are to Latino constituents” and, 
further, that response rate is higher for English-speaking constituents.192 Accordingly, the results 
offer “fairly strong evidence of bias” that “may be rooted in personal attitudes toward ethnicity 
cued by constituents names.”193 
 Obstacles to registration pose another issue and have been proven to disproportionately 
impact minority voters. The contentious 2018 Georgia governor’s race between Democrat Stacy 
Abrams and Republican Brian Kemp demonstrated this severe impact. In 2018, 53,000 
Georgians who registered or re-registered to vote had their registrations on hold as a result of the 
“exact match” verification process.194 This policy requires that all information on a voter’s 
application match the information filed with the Georgia Department of Driver Services or the 
Social Security Administration.195 An error could be as simple as a dropped hyphen or an added 
period.196 Despite Kemp’s campaign spokesman, Ryan Mahoney, arguing that “it has never been 
easier to vote in our state” because of Kemp’s work as Georgia’s Secretary of State, the 
disproportionate impact on black voters is clear.197 “Georgia’s population is approximately 32 
percent black,” however, “the list of voter registrations on hold with Kemp’s office [was] nearly 
70 percent black.”198 A 1986 case, Windy Boy v. Big Horn County, further exemplifies the long 
history of election officials unfairly assessing voter registration cards from minority voters.199 
Testimony in Windy Boy confirmed that election administrators were “hypertechnical as Indian 
registration increased and looked for minor errors” in order to refuse Native American voters 
from registering.200 
 In addition to obstacles that stand in the way of eligible voters receiving election 
information and successfully registering, issues also arise when eligible voters attempt to cast the 
ballot. One challenge to mail-voting trickles down from inaccurate purges. Many voters have 
been the victims of purges, a process by election officials to remove names deemed ineligible 
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from the voter registration lists.201 According to federal law, when accurately completed, purges 
remove names of individuals with a “disenfranchising criminal conviction,” individuals who 
have changed residence, individuals who have died, and individuals with “mental incapacity.”202 
When flawed, however, purges disenfranchise eligible voters. States vary in how voter purges 
are conducted.203 Studies have shown an uptick in purge rates since 2014 in jurisdictions with a 
history of racial discrimination.204 Research suggests that this uptick was a direct result of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Shelby County v. Holder in 2013, “which ended federal 
‘preclearance,’ a Voting Rights Act provision that was enacted to apply extra scrutiny to 
jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination.”205 This Supreme Court case holding is 
frequently cited to as the moment the dam burst, opening the gates to a flood of new voting 
restrictions that would otherwise have required pre-clearance under the Voting Rights Act.206 
 Flawed purges are typically the results of “bad information” or “bad method[s].”207 For 
example, in 2016, a list sent from the Arkansas secretary of state to county officials included 
more than 7,700 records “from the Arkansas Crime Information Center (ACIC) of persons who 
were supposedly ineligible to vote and should be removed from the rolls.”208 In reality, the list 
included names of people who had “some involvement with the court system,” for reasons 
including divorce, but were otherwise completely legitimate voters.209 Less than 5,000 of the 
names purged were corrected within two months of the realization.210 In 2012, Texas officials 
purged voter registration lists based on the Social Security Administration’s Death Master 
File.211 However, officials made “weak matches,” meaning minimal information was matched 
and, without additional investigation, individuals were purged.212 Texas has since changed this 
method.213 Weak matches have been proven to disproportionately impact minority voters, as was 
the case with Crosscheck, a program that identified “double voters,” which are voters “who have 
registrations in two states or who actually voted in an election in multiple states.”214 Crosscheck 
used matching criteria that was “based on first name, last name, and birthdate.”215 However, non-
white voters are more likely to share names.216 Specifically, “16.3 percent of Hispanic people 
and 13% of black people have one of the 10 most common surnames, compared to 4.5% of white 
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people.”217 Crosscheck, which has since been indefinitely suspended,218 displayed how purges 
based on minimal matching information place minority voters at a larger risk of being purged.219  
 The 2018 governor’s race between Abrams and Kemp also illustrated the deep-rooted 
impact of voter purging, specifically on minority voters. Kemp, who took office in 2010 and 
served as the Georgia Secretary of State at the time, overseeing the election for which he was a 
candidate, had long been criticized for implementing tight voter restrictions, like purging voters 
from registration lists who had not voted for three consecutive years.220 As a result, 1.5 million 
voters were purged between 2012 and 2016, which was twice as many purged between 2008 and 
2012221 with 668,000 voters purged in 2017.222 Of the voters purged in 2017, investigative 
reporter, Greg Palast, found that over 340,000 of the 400,000 who had supposedly moved had 
not in fact moved and were purged for having not voted in one or two elections.223 As was the 
case in 2018, often purged voters are unaware that their names have been removed from voter 
registration lists and only realize the error on or shortly before Election Day, leaving no time to 
correct the mistake and successfully cast a vote.224 
 Another ongoing issue restricting eligible voters are photo ID requirements. According to 
the Help America Vote Act,225 “all states require identification from first-time voters who 
register to vote by mail and have not provided verification of their identification at the time of 
registration.”226 The acceptable forms of ID listed include a "current and valid photo 
identification" or "a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, 
or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter.”227As explained by 
Brennan Center for Justice President, Michael Waldman, the issue is not that photo IDs are 
required, after all “[e]lection integrity is vital,” but that eligible voters are unable to acquire the 
photo IDs required.228 The number of voting-age citizens in the United States who do not have a 
current government-issued photo ID is disproportionately people of color. In fact, 25% of voting-
age citizens without a current government-issued photo ID are black citizens and only 8% are 
white citizens.229 Eligible voters consistently face accessibility issues when attempting to acquire 
free photo IDs. In 2012 “1.2 million eligible black voters and 500,000 eligible Hispanic voters 
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live[d] more than 10 miles from their nearest ID-issuing office open more than two days a 
week.”230 Additionally, “1.2 million eligible voters whose incomes [fell] below the federal 
poverty line live[d] more than 10 miles from their nearest state ID-issuing office open more than 
two days a week.”231 Obviously, those who need a photo ID do not have a driver’s license and, 
therefore, must rely on other forms of transportation to get to the specified government office.232 
Even for eligible voters who can overcome the logistical challenges to visit the necessary 
government office, applicants of free photo IDs must pay for required supporting documentation, 
which can range from $15 to $347, depending on what documents are needed.233 
 Obstacles also arise for eligible voters who have photo ID, but whose photo ID is not 
acceptable based on state law. Since 2010, over twenty-five states have enacted new voting 
restrictions, including strict photo ID requirements.234 State voter ID law varies in what qualifies 
as a voter ID.235 For example, in Texas, one acceptable form of ID is a Texas license to carry a 
handgun, but a Texas student ID is not listed.236 Notably, in 2018 “[m]ore than 80 percent of 
handgun licenses issued to Texans . . . went to white Texans, while more than half of the students 
in the University of Texas system are racial or ethnic minorities.”237 Therefore, eligible voters 
whose only photo ID is a Texas student ID card must apply for an additional form of photo ID to 
be eligible to cast a ballot. 
 If a voter can overcome the hurdles previously discussed, there is still the issue of having 
their mail-ballot reviewed and rejected. Election officials tasked with matching information on 
an absentee ballot to the information on file “often need to determine whether [a] mistake is 
cause to invalidate the ballot.238 Determining whether the ballot ought to be discarded can rely on 
something as simple as comparing if an “r” or an “s” looks the same in the signature on the ballot 
as the signature on file.239 After the 2018 election, an analysis done by the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution of 245,000 absentee ballots from every Georgia county found that “nearly 7,000 
ballots, or 3 percent of the total votes cast,” were rejected “often for relatively minor 
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transgressions such as marking the outside of the absentee ballot incorrectly.”240 The analysis 
also found that “[m]inority voters were twice as likely to have their ballots rejected.”241 Similar 
to examples previously discussed of implicit bias dictating lower response rates to Latino 
constituents or “exact match” verification processes for registration, “[r]esearch into implicit bias 
indicates that the risk is high that these seemingly ministerial decisions may be infected by 
unconscious biases.”242 Whether unconscious or intentional, evidence shows that minority voters 
are feeling the impact. 
 The severe impacts already illustrated during normal election years will undeniably be 
heightened when the election is during a national crisis. Therefore, in suggesting mail-in voting 
as a solution during the COVID-19 pandemic, additional improvements must be made to confirm 
that eligible voters who have historically been disenfranchised have access to ballots and that 
their votes are counted. 
 
2. Advocates and Solutions 
 The historical discrepancies in voting raises great concern about universalizing mail 
voting. How can we assure voters that universalizing mail-voting will not lead to more rejected 
ballots?243 Advocates fighting against disenfranchisement of eligible voters during normal 
election years offer concrete suggestions for improvement. The pandemic situation provides 
opportunity to expedite implementation of these tangible solutions that improve minority voters’ 
accessibility to exercise the franchise. 
 The first suggestion is universalizing Automatic Voter Registration (AVR). The National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 requires states to “offer voter registration opportunities at State 
motor vehicle agencies,” to offer mail-in registration application opportunities, and to offer voter 
registration opportunities at specified State and local offices.244 Notably, not all states are 
covered by the NVRA requirements.245 However, as data collection has shifted from paper to 
digital in state DMV systems, there has also been movement to automating the voter registration 
process.246 Various state agencies now participate in state AVR processes.247 The “Oregon 
Model,” appropriately named after Oregon as the first state to use AVR in 2016, automatically 
opts an eligible voter into registration after any interaction with the DMV.248 “The voter is later 
sent a notification informing them that they were registered and that they can opt-out by 
returning the notification.”249 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL), there are four main approaches by states to AVR and, “[a]s of April 2020, 19 states and 
the District of Columbia are categorized by NCSL as having automatic voter registration.”250 In 
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advocating for automatic registration, Heather K. Gerken, senior legal advisor to the Obama 
Campaign, points to paper applications as plaguing the registration process, leading to errors and 
incorrect registration lists.251 According to Gerken, universal registration “promotes both” access 
and integrity in elections.252 “Liberals should welcome universal registration because it makes 
voting easier. Conservatives ought to like the system because it prevents registration fraud.”253 
Furthermore, Gerken counters that a privacy argument against automatic registration is baseless 
because “voter lists would be compiled using information that the state already has.”254 Whether 
the argument is based on cost comparisons, accessibility, or the basic understanding that voting 
is a right of all Americans, there is strong advocacy for AVR. In short, an initial step to ensure 
that mail-voting does not disenfranchise eligible voters is to implement universal AVR.255  
 The next suggestion is to modify the purging process. Since election officials will only 
send mail-in ballots to voters on registration lists, it is vital that the lists be updated and accurate. 
The Brennan Center for Justice offers suggestions for how to “reduce erroneous purges” of voter 
rolls.256 As discussed previously, programs like Crosscheck have been proven unreliable and 
disproportionately impact voters of color because of the weak matching criteria. Therefore, the 
matching criteria should “require matches across many fields.”257 This would require a match 
between “first name, last name, address, date of birth, social security number, and driver’s 
license number,” instead of just a name and address match.258 Additionally, accuracy of the data 
used should be confirmed by consulting other sources “rather than assuming one source is 
flawless” and “[u]se of the list should be adjusted in accordance with the list’s reliability.”259 
Ideally, this would prevent eligible voter names from being swept up in the purges. 
 Purges should also be completed with plenty of time to correct any purging errors prior to 
Election Day. The Brennan Center recommends that purges – including citizen-initiated voter 
challenges – be completed at least ninety days prior to any federal, state, or local election.260 
“While federal law requires systematic maintenance to be completed by 90 days before federal 
elections, the logic behind that blackout period applies equally to state and local elections as 
well.”261 Setting this ninety-day deadline prevents last minute purges and provides sufficient 
time for election officials to notify the public and individual voters of the purge, thereby alerting 
eligible voters who have been incorrectly removed from the roll to take action.262 
 Implicit bias as a root cause of ballot invalidation must also be addressed. Including 
implicit bias training as a requirement for all poll workers would offer a first step in recognizing 
the deeply rooted and far-reaching impacts of implicit biases.263 Diversifying poll workers could 
also “lower the risk that implicit biases impact the voting process.”264 Additionally, introducing a 
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blind review of all voter registration applications could entirely remove the opportunity for 
implicit biases to surface.265 These adjustments could protect voters from implicit biases that 
may dictate an election worker’s decision to reject a registration form or ballot based on a minor 
error or an unclear letter. 
 Finally, advocates suggest that mail-ballots during COVID-19 can serve as a 
confirmation tool, thereby expanding accessibility to voters. Firstly, issuing mail-ballot 
applications to all registered voters serves as a reminder to inactive voters – voters who are still 
eligible to vote but might be removed from rolls without further action – to confirm eligibility.266 
Secondly, the action of requesting a mail-ballot could serve as confirmation to “move[] a voter 
from the inactive list to the active list,”267 as a sufficient response to an NVRA notice,268 as a 
registration application by a non-registered eligible voter, or as “[g]rounds to reinstate a voter 
purged for change of address” by confirmation that the voter did not in fact change address.269 
Combining these processes would allow eligible voters to efficiently and effectively cast a ballot. 
 There are clear accessibility discrepancies among voter populations. In response to the 
COVID-19 situation, there is an immediate need to universalize mail-voting, which sets the stage 
for expedited implementations of necessary adjustments outlined by advocates to improve voter 
accessibility. 
  
3. Lessons Learned from the 2020 Primary Season 
 Even though states attempted to improve voting accessibility by expanding vote-by-mail 
options during the 2020 primary season, states’ election officials were not sufficiently prepared. 
The primary season saw “ballots lost in the mail; some printed on the wrong paper, with the 
wrong date or the wrong language” and “others arriving weeks after they were requested or 
never arriving at all.”270 “Thousands of voters in Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Rhode 
Island, West Virginia and D.C. reported requesting but not receiving absentee ballots in time to 
vote.”271 In Pennsylvania, “roughly 2,000 voters were sent the wrong party ballot in Montgomery 
County.”272 Additionally, even though Pennsylvania had created an online ballot-request form 
with ballot tracking, “the system didn’t always register a sent ballot, and the online application 
was only in English.”273 Furthermore, Pennsylvania voters could submit the online ballot-request 
form up to one week before Election Day, which did not provide sufficient time for election 
officials to mail the absentee ballots to voters and for voters to return the completed ballot for 
their vote to be counted.274 In Maryland, absentee ballots were mailed to all registered voters, but 
the registration lists used were outdated and, specifically in Baltimore, “1 in 10 ballots, or about 
20,000 total” ballots were returned.275 Voters in Baltimore also vocalized frustrations with lack 
of information regarding the adjustments made to the election process, leading to Joanne 
Antoine, the executive director of Common Cause Maryland explaining that “investment needs 
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to be made in voter education” to avoid future glitches.276 In some cases, states that expanded the 
mail-voting option removed polling places, perhaps incorrectly assuming a seamless transition 
into mail-voting and failing to account for voters who require the in-person voting option. In 
Washington, D.C., where election officials received 15 times more than the normal number of 
absentee ballot requests, voters who went to polling places “waited as long as four hours” in 
lines at one of the twenty open polling places, “compared with the usual 143.”277 State and 
federal officials must recognize these mistakes and make necessary changes prior to November. 
 Particularly, states need assistance from the federal government. In a report issued by the 
Brennan Center for Justice and with the consensus of the Alliance for Securing Democracy, Pitt 
Cyber, and R Street Institution, the costs required to ensure a safe November election during 
COVID-19 requires federal funding and congressional support beyond the $400 million in grants 
issued as part of the March economic relief package.278 In looking specifically at the local and 
state costs of five states, the report pinpointed the necessary costs to account for absentee ballot 
education and outreach, processing absentee ballot applications, processing and tabulating 
absentee ballots, building additional necessary infrastructures, and creating healthy and secure 
in-person voting options.279 Shockingly, the report found that the federal funding provided in 
March to assist states with elections during COVID-19 would account for merely 9-10% of 
Georgia’s needs, 11-12% of Michigan’s needs, 11-13% of Missouri’s needs, 16-18% of Ohio’s 
needs, and 16-18% of Pennsylvania’s needs.280 States cannot ensure safe and secure voting 
without additional federal assistance. 
 Officials and voters must also recognize and accept a different timeline with increased 
usage of mail ballots. Primarily, results will not be finalized on election night. Instead of 
expecting an immediate winner, voters and candidates in 2020 should prepare for an accurate 
final count to be announced days, or even weeks after Election Day.281 According to David J. 
Becker, the director of the Center for Election Innovation and Research, “It’s much more 
important to get the count right, than to get it fast.”282 
 In using universal mail-voting during a global health pandemic to protect public health 
and safety, there will be old and new issues of accessibility to account for.283 When successfully 
prepared for and implemented, mail-voting will not result in insurmountable cases of election 
fraud, nor will mail-voting favor one political party over another. However, mail-voting could 
make a difficult situation worse for historically disenfranchised eligible voters if states and the 
federal government do not take necessary steps to prepare for November. 
 
IV. RESPONDING TO COVID-19 
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 Since absentee voting originated during a time of crisis – the Civil War – it seems 
reasonable for contemporary development of absentee and mail voting to accommodate civilians 
during a pandemic. However, recent challenges have come up short.284 Specifically, two 
Supreme Court decisions have addressed absentee voting during the pandemic and have set the 
likely stage for a business-as-usual November election.  
 In Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,285 the Supreme 
Court reviewed a decision by a Wisconsin District Court. The District Court permitted two 
adjustments to the April 7, 2020 primary election as a response to COVID-19: the deadline by 
which municipal clerks could receive ballots was extended from election day to Monday, April 
13 and absentee ballots would be counted if received by Monday, April 13 even if postmarked 
after election day.286 The Supreme Court majority referred to the case issue as a “technical 
question about the absentee ballot process,” highlighting that extending the postmark date 
“fundamentally alters the nature of the election.”287 As such, the Supreme Court held that the 
District Court erred in granting the extension through two lines of reasoning. The first focused on 
the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motions, which did not ask for an extension of the postmark 
date, noting that the District Court gave this unilaterally.288 The second pointed to the extension 
as changing election rules “so close to the election date,” citing that the Supreme Court “has 
repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on 
the eve of an election.”289  
 The dissent, penned by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, addressed the 2020 primary election 
as being anything but ordinary. Justice Ginsburg highlighted the impact of COVID-19 and the 
Governor’s stay-at-home order on the election and polling places.290 She specifically cited the 
surge of absentee ballot requests and the backlog of ballots to be mailed, which were unlikely to 
reach voters in time to be postmarked by election day.291 Justice Ginsburg wrote further that 
“[t]he Court’s suggestion that the current situation is not ‘substantially different’ from ‘an 
ordinary election’ boggles the mind.”292 The majority’s claim of inconsistency contradicts the 
history of election modifications made during times of crisis, as discussed in Part I. The Court, 
calling the relief requested “extraordinary”293 and seemingly not appropriate for the present 
situation fails to acknowledge the crisis of the pandemic or the long history of election 
modification during or in the wake of a crisis. Justice Ginsburg concluded that "[t]he majority of 
this Court declares that this case presents a ‘narrow, technical question.’ That is wrong. The 
question here is whether tens of thousands of Wisconsin citizens can vote safely in the midst of a 
pandemic."294 
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 The Supreme Court has also seen and denied a request from Texas.295 Texas election 
code permits qualified voters who are absent from their county of residence on election day,296 
have a sickness or physical condition “that prevents the voter from appearing at the polling place 
on election day,”297 are aged sixty-five or older on election day,298 or are confined in jail and 
pending trial or serving a misdemeanor sentence299 to vote early by mail. The State Democratic 
Party, the party chairperson, and three voters brought the case, arguing, among other points, age 
discrimination under the Texas Election Codes, violating the Twenty-Sixth Amendment by 
allowing voters only aged sixty-five and older to submit mail-in ballots.300 In May, U.S. District 
Judge Fred Biery signed an order confirming that, “[a]ny eligible Texas voter who seeks to vote 
by mail in order to avoid transmission of COVID-19 can apply for, receive, and cast an absentee 
ballot in upcoming elections” due to the pandemic circumstances.301 “Texas intervened and filed 
a notice of interlocutory appeal, which, under Texas law, superseded and stayed the 
injunction.”302 In response to Judge Biery’s holding, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals called the 
order one “that will be remembered more for audacity than legal reasoning” and granted the 
motion for stay.303 Texas Attorney General, Ken Paxton, asserting that absentee voting is a right, 
not a privilege, argued that since Texas voters maintain the option to vote in-person and “[t]here 
is no constitutional right to vote by mail,” then voters are not disenfranchised.304 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court denied the application to vacate the motion for stay.  
 While the door is open for challenges to the November election during COVID-19, a 
successful claim for has yet to come through it. The Court in Republican National Committee v. 
Democratic National Committee welcomed future challenges to the election, concluding that 
"[t]he Court's decision on the narrow question before the Court should not be viewed as 
expressing an opinion on the broader question of whether to hold the election, or whether other 
reforms or modifications in election procedures in light of COVID–19 are appropriate."305 
Adding a comment to the Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott decision, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
noted she “hope[s] that the Court of Appeals will consider the merits of the legal issues in this 
case well in advance of the November election.”306  
 Akin to the modifications made during prior crises discussed in Part I, mail-voting 
prioritizes protecting the general public and preserves the fundamental right to vote. The solution 
is not an attempt to fit into the standing absentee ballot excuses or challenge state statutes under 
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment – although there is merit in these arguments and additional cases 
will likely be brought in the future - but to address the public health crisis first by implementing 
countermeasures that will prevent the spread of a deadly virus. 
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B. MAIL-VOTING AS A COUNTERMEASURE TO COVID-19 
 Although the 1918 election continued as normal, “[t]he history of epidemics offers 
considerable advice, but only if people know the history and respond with wisdom.”307 The 2020 
election, despite the similarities to 1918, should not continue as normal. In applying the court’s 
reasoning in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,308 the logical conclusion to combat the current crisis is 
to implement mail-voting as a countermeasure – or NPI – to the pandemic. 
 Jacobson is the “leading authority for public health police powers.”309 The claim in 
Jacobson was brought in 1905 during a time when smallpox was “prevalent to some extent” in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.310 State statute permitted the city’s board of health to “‘require and 
enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants’” if deemed necessary to protect 
the public health and safety.311 An updated regulation highlighted the increasing smallpox cases 
and implemented a mandatory vaccination or revaccination for all Cambridge inhabitants, calling 
the vaccinations “necessary for the speedy extermination of the disease.”312 In reasoning why the 
smallpox vaccination was permissible under Massachusetts’ police power, the Court noted that 
the U.S. Constitution “does not import an absolute right” to be “wholly freed from restraint,” 
citing prior holdings that “recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and property are 
subjected to all kinds of restrains and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and 
prosperity of the state.’”313  
 There are three points in the Court’s reasoning that are necessary to highlight and to 
apply to the current crisis. The first is the Court’s clarification that the vaccination requirement 
was only applicable “when, in the opinion of the board of health, [vaccination] was necessary for 
the public health or the public safety.” Specifically, “a community has the right to protect itself 
against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.”314 This delineates a 
clear difference between times of crisis and times of peace.315 Additionally, it specifies that the 
measure used for protection must be “necessary,” thus limiting states from utilizing police power 
in a way “so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public” during the 
crisis.316 The second is the Court’s acknowledgement that there are opposing theories of how to 
most effectively protect the public from smallpox, nevertheless, the state legislature “recognized 
vaccination as at least an effective, if not the best-known way in which to meet and suppress the 
evils of a smallpox epidemic that imperiled an entire population.”317 This echoes the concept of 
layering318 countermeasures to successfully respond to a pandemic when multiple 
countermeasures are effective. The third is the Court’s recognition that the means presented in 
the statute – vaccination to counter the rising smallpox spread – are clearly asserted with 
“substantial relation” to the goal of protecting public health and safety.319 This assertion is 
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supported, in part, by the prevalence of many state statutes requiring vaccinations for children 
attending public school.320 Therefore, the more commonly used the countermeasure, the most 
likely there is a proven “substantial relation” between the measure and success in protecting 
public health and safety.321  
 Thus, in establishing support for the mandatory vaccination as a pharmaceutical 
countermeasure to smallpox, the holding relied on three terms. First, that the countermeasure 
being applied be during an epidemic. Second, that the countermeasure be proven effective. 
Third, that the countermeasure be “substantially related” to protecting public safety. This article 
suggests that mail-voting be used for the 2020 general election due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Survey data confirms the effectiveness of mail-voting and debunks the theory that mail-voting 
leads to heightened election fraud or benefits one political party over the other. Lastly, mail-
voting, which supports enacted NPIs, aims to protect public health by removing opportunities for 
crowds to gather. The three lines of reasoning from Jacobson are met. 
 The Jacobson court heavily relied on the logic of a prior case, Viemester v. White,322 
which addressed mandatory smallpox vaccinations for public school students. The Viemester 
court reasoned that “[i]f vaccination strongly tends to prevent the transmission or spread of this 
disease, it logically follows that children may be refused admission to the public schools until 
they have been vaccinated.”323 The court further reasoned that even if “some laymen, both 
learned and unlearned” do not believe vaccination to prevent smallpox, but the “mass of the 
people” and “most members of the medical profession do accept it,” then vaccination is a proper 
measure to protect the general public.324 Most importantly for the analogy at hand is the 
Viemester court’s explanation that if “[vaccination] is generally accepted in theory and generally 
applied in practice, both by the voluntary action of the people and in obedience to the command 
of law,” for example, by statute, then there is good reason to find the measure appropriate.325 The 
court concluded that when common belief shares that vaccination prevents smallpox, mandating 
vaccination is a health law “for the protection of all the people of the state” is an appropriate 
measure.326 
 As if the Viemeister court were speaking on current events, “[t]he fact that the belief is 
not universal is not controlling, for there is scarcely any belief that is accepted by every one.”327  
By applying the reasoning in Viemeister, mail-in-voting should be viewed as a countermeasure, 
much like mandatory vaccinations. In applying this reasoning to the current pandemic, if a 
countermeasure “prevent[s] the transmission or spread of” COVID-19, it “logically follows” that 
the countermeasure should be implemented.328 As discussed previously in the article, lifting 
quarantine orders prior to the 1918 election and removing shelter-in-place orders in summer 
2020 both resulted in heightened flu infection and death rates. Mail-voting, unlike in-person 
voting, enables voters to vote from home and prevents crowded polling places and lines, thereby 
avoiding the mistakes made in 1918. Additionally, survey results and recently enacted 
emergency statutes demonstrate “accept[ance] by the mass of the people”329 and bipartisan 
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support to implement mail-voting for the upcoming election. Furthermore, mail-voting, under the 
name of absentee voting, has been “applied in practice”330 since the Civil War. Every state and 
the District of Columbia uses mail-voting in some form and relies on mail-voting to ensure 
exercise of the franchise. Therefore, despite President Trump’s assertions about fraud and 
favoritism, mail-voting is more than “generally accepted,” since it has bi-partisan support and is 
nationally applied in practice. “[F]or the protection of all the people of the state”331 during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, mail-voting is a necessary contemporary countermeasure. 
 When implementing mail-voting as a countermeasure, there must remain an exception to 
accommodate for specific populations who are unable to vote by mail. In Jacobson, the court 
upheld the statute for mandatory smallpox vaccinations, also noting the exception for children 
who were “‘unfit subjects for vaccination,’” proven by a physician’s certificate. Similarly, there 
are eligible voters who would be disenfranchised if voting was offered solely by mail-in 
ballots332 since universal mail-voting alone does not accommodate the needs of all eligible 
voters. Thus, voters who must vote in-person must also have an accessible option to do so 
effectively and safely during the pandemic.  
 During COVID-19, there will be two issues of accessibility to consider: whether all 
people have access to the tools needed to receive and cast a ballot by mail and whether polling 
places will be accessible to the voters who require an in-person option. If the suggestions offered 
in Part III to support minority voters and states’ election officials are successfully implemented, 
then most eligible voters will receive mail ballots and will cast ballots through mail. 
Additionally, if states implement AVR or adjust registration requirements for first-time voters, 
then these voters will not need to rely on in-person voting for same-day voter registration.333 The 
accommodations made at polling places may look different than a typical election year because 
they will favor those who do not have the tools needed to vote at home. Therefore, election 
officials must consider specific accessibility needs. 
 Voters with certain disabilities will require an in-person voting option.334 “While some 
voters with disabilities may be able to request large-print or Braille mail and absentee ballots, or 
receive their ballots electronically, others may require electronic ballot marking systems or other 
accommodations available only when voting in person.”335 A 2017 study completed by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) illustrated how features outside and inside polling 
places impede voters with disabilities.336 Out of 137 polling places fully examined by GAO in 
2017, some stations could not accommodate people using wheelchairs, “which might have 
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required someone else to help” the voter.337 What is an unacceptable polling place environment 
during a normal election would be catastrophic during a pandemic election, considering the 
greater risk of COVID-19 to immunocompromised individuals.338 Therefore election officials 
must not only secure necessary voting materials for voters with disabilities, election officials 
must also select easily accessible polling place locations and create polling place layouts that 
accommodate voters. 
 Voters with literary or language barriers will also require the in-person voting option.339 
According to the Center for Civic Designs, “poor translations make more work for non-English 
speakers” and, overall, printed information is not sufficient material to prepare and assist voters 
with language barriers.340 Therefore, voters with literary or language barriers will rely on 
assistance from bilingual, multilingual, or trained poll workers. 
 Furthermore, voters with no permanent address or without mail delivery services will 
require an in-person voting option.341 Voters experiencing homelessness are eligible to vote, 
however, while these voters can list public shelters, parks, or cross-streets as their address, voters 
likely do not have a mailing address for receiving the mail-ballot.342 Additionally, voters without 
mail delivery services to their place of residence encounter absentee-voting obstacles. Native 
Americans living on reservations may not have addresses or may have “non-traditional 
addresses.”343 According to the Native American Rights Fund, in addition to the postal service 
not delivering to these addresses, “some precincts prohibit the delivery of election materials to 
non-traditional addresses.”344 Additionally, Native Americans who are unable to receive postal 
service to their place of residence must use P.O. boxes, for which there are few, and the P.O. 
boxes are often very far, in rural areas where mail is frequently delayed.345 Therefore, not only 
do Native American voters need in-person voting options, these voters also need polling places 
at tribally designated buildings, akin to accommodations made in Washington.346 Washington, 
one of the five all-mail states, permits federally recognized tribes to request state facilities be 
designated for voter services to ensure access to voting.347  
 Additional voter populations may also need in-person voting access and eligible voters 
may fall into more than one of these populations. Therefore, open polling places must have all 
necessary material to ensure voters can vote, be it through a regular ballot or a provisional 
ballot.348 
 The pandemic situation also requires heightened safety measures at polling places. The 
CDC has published guidance for how to prevent the COVID-19 spread while preparing election 
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polling locations.349 Unsurprisingly, the reoccurring recommendation for how to maintain 
healthy operations highlights the need for alternative voting methods in order to minimize 
crowds and contact.350 Fewer in-person voters creates a safer environment for voters and poll-
workers alike. Efficiency at polling places will be key to avoid crowding and long lines, even 
with fewer in-person voters. Poll workers must be thoroughly trained on the election adjustments 
resulting from COVID-19 and must also have extensive understanding of provisional ballots351 
in order to assist voters clearly, quickly, and from a safe distance. Election officials must also 
follow a cleaning schedule to ensure consistent disinfecting of surfaces, shared objects, and 
voting-associated equipment.352 Additionally, election officials must enforce social-distancing 
measures and modify polling place layouts.353 
 Combining universalized mail-voting with in-person voting options for specific 
populations provides voters safe options for casting a ballot in the November 2020 election. To 
paraphrase the Viemeister court, although mail-voting is not universally supported, the naysayers 
led by President Trump should not be the controlling factor, especially where history, logic, and 
a mass of the voting population have proven that mail-voting is generally “accepted in theory 
and generally applied in practice.”354 While arguments may continue as to whether mail-voting 
merely offers convenience or honors and preserves the right of suffrage,355 it has nonetheless 
proven to be a reliable and established form of voting. Implementing mail-voting during the 
national pandemic protects public health and public safety while providing individuals a safe and 
accessible opportunity to exercise their fundamental right to vote. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In the future, when the COVID-19 public health crisis is contained, the U.S. will look 
back and assess. Reports will detail the numbers of infected and deceased. Researchers will 
expose the long-term impacts of the virus on survivors. Academics will compare the 2020 
presidential election with prior elections held during and in the wake of a crisis. The U.S. will 
either “remorsefully realize[]” that it was again unable to appropriately respond to a “perceived 
security crisis”356 or the U.S. will prove that it learned the lessons of pandemics and crises past 
by “respond[ing] with wisdom.”357  
 Following President Trump’s “overblown and factually unfounded”358 claims about mail-
voting would undoubtedly place an incorrectly perceived threat over the health and safety of the 
general public during a true global pandemic. Not only is mail-voting a necessary contemporary 
countermeasure to protect the public during COVID-19, but the pandemic situation also puts 
voting accessibility discrepancies at the forefront and provides the chance to expedite 
improvements. The opportunity is here to universalize mail-in voting to protect the public during 
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a national crisis and to correct errors in the election process that have historically disenfranchised 
minority populations. The question is, will we take it? 
